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Introduction 
The rise of cyber security as an important factor in international rela-
tions has taken on many guises. Originally mostly an economic issue, it 
was quickly followed by international security agendas, and, in recent 
years, a lively debate on human rights. The developmental context is a 
relative newcomer to this field. The key instrument connecting the var-
ious discourses is increasingly referred to as Cyber Security Capacity 
Building (CCB), and, although only few governments today maintain 
such programmes (often accounting for a tiny fraction of overall aid 
flows), CCB seems set to play an important role in future foreign policy 
considerations. 
There are three principle reasons why CCB is likely to grow in im-
portance. Firstly, it is becoming increasingly clear that a key factor in 
economic and social development (and therefore political stability) is 
access to cyberspace. In turn, cyber security becomes a key ingredient 
for promoting this access, and ensuring that it is not jeopardized 
through predatory criminal behaviour. Secondly, given the nature of 
the Internet, if countries in the rich industrialized world are to be able 
to respond to cyber-threats against their own citizens, increasing coop-
eration is needed with the developing world – which increasingly hosts 
the infrastructure and indeed the actors behind malicious cyber activi-
ty. Such cooperation can be possible only if basic cyber security institu-
tions and skills are present in the partner countries – which is very 
much in the direct interest of donor countries. Thirdly, the increasingly 
politicized global struggle for dominance over governance of the Inter-
net makes the issue of overriding importance within international rela-
tions. With two opposing views emerging on how the Internet should 
be governed, the importance of the ‘swing states’ – nearly all within the 
developing world – also grows. While the present study does not advo-
cate using CCB as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy, the 
‘soft power’ aspect of aid in general (and CCB in particular) should not 
be ignored. Given this triple rationale (regional stability, national secu-
rity, and international diplomacy), CCB may well become one of the 
most important activities within the security/development nexus in the 
future. 
This study concentrates on providing the rationale and identifying 
potential ‘dimensions’ for such governmental CCB instruments, and 
what tasks they should cover. The ‘methodological’ dimension includes 
developing frameworks for assessing and delivering CCB programmes, 
but also extends to general frameworks for supporting a country’s na-
tional cyber security strategy – as well as the basic research needed. 
The ‘technical’ dimension is concentrated on the need to train and 
support the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and law-
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enforcement capabilities of partner countries. In fact, such initiatives 
had already been ongoing for many years before the term ‘CCB’ was 
coined. Thirdly, the existence of ‘infrastructure’ development pro-
grammes has long been a feature of international development, albeit 
without much focus on security concerns. Fourthly, the instrument of 
overall ‘budgetary support’ can be used for directly funding partner 
countries’ operational expenses in issues related to cyber security over 
a prolonged period.  
The study concludes with some recommendations for policy-makers. 
 
1. Cyber Security Capacity Building 
(CCB): Developing access 
The Internet provides a major developmental opportunity for the Global 
South, or the ‘developing world’. As noted in a recent World Economic 
Forum report (WEF, 2015), in 2014, emerging markets were home to 
96% of all the human beings who were not connected to the Internet 
and the ‘digital economy.’ As defined by the WEF, the digital economy 
is that part of the economy made possible by the fact that ‘almost 3 
billion connected consumers and businesses search, shop, socialize, 
transact and interact every day using personal computers (PCs) and, 
increasingly, mobile devices.’1 This digital economy ‘contributed $2.3 
trillion to the G20’s GDP in 2010 and an estimated $4 trillion in 2016, 
[and] is growing at 10% a year – significantly faster than the overall 
G20 economy’ (WEF, 2015). In emerging markets, the annual growth 
rate of the digital economy ranges between 15 and 25%, greatly out-
stripping growth rates in the developed world. There is growing evi-
dence that the increased use of ICT – including Internet access – is a 
significant driver of growth in the developing world. Indeed, some re-
search indicates that in the first decade of the millennium alone, up to 
one fourth of the growth in developing countries derived from the de-
ployment of ICT – a trend expected to accelerate in the second decade 
(ITIF, 2012). The World Bank (IC4D, 2009) has found that a 10% in-
crease in high-speed broadband Internet penetration adds 1.38% to 
annual per capita GDP growth in developing countries. Likewise, a 
10% increase in mobile phone penetration adds 0.81% to annual per 
capita GDP growth in developing countries (IC4D, 2009). Clearly, ICT is 
rapidly becoming not only a key factor in promoting development and 
therefore stability, but perhaps the single most important factor. 
Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) represents one approach to 
fostering ICT-led growth and stability in developing countries. Unlike 
other developmental approaches, it is concerned primarily (although 
not exclusively) with security-related issues. As is the case with many 
security issues, it has not been universally defined and different coun-
tries use different holistic approaches to CCB. The Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office’s (FCO) goals2 for their CCB programme derive direct-
ly from the national goals of the UK National Cyber Security Strategy 
(UK Cabinet Office, 2011) –transposed into an overseas development 
framework. On the other hand, the cyber security strategy of the EU 
(JOIN, 2013) mentions the development of norms of government be-
haviour, the economic prospects of growth and security issues, and is 
                                                          
1 Figure from Euromonitor International, 2014 
2 See Box 6 
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explicitly principles-based: ‘The EU's core values apply as much in the 
digital as in the physical world.’ These values include ‘Protecting fun-
damental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy’ as 
well as ‘Access for all’ and ‘Democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder 
governance’. 
CCB is a recent addition to the security/development nexus. In com-
parison to other security and development issues, like Security Sector 
Reform (SSR), or Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-Integration 
(DDR), CCB stands out as much more connected to the broader econom-
ic landscape, with security issues that are even more immediately 
cross-border, and deals with overall issues that are (arguably) much 
more complex in width (thematic reach) and depth (technical detail).  
This section presents what we believe to be the underlying rationale 
for supporting CCB at the political level. Firstly, CCB can assist in eco-
nomic development, thereby helping to promote stability in the devel-
oping country. Secondly, CCB can help bring partner and donor coun-
tries closer together in the evolving international cyber security archi-
tecture, with tangible effects on the security of donor countries. Third-
ly, CCB can help promote and enhance freedom on and through the 
Internet by encouraging participation in Internet governance.  
1.1 Promoting access to economic growth through an ena-
bling business environment 
Economic growth contributes to political stability, and ICT plays an 
ever-growing role in growth. As noted by the World Economic Forum 
report (WEF, 2015), recent annual growth in the digital economy rang-
es between 15 and 25%, but to realize the potential impact on econom-
ic growth, emerging markets face two challenges: expanding their net-
work coverage, and building their network capacity. 
Expanding network coverage 
As an increasing literature on the impacts of broadband shows, widely 
available broadband has a significant impact on GDP growth. As noted 
by the World Bank (IC4D, 2012), it ‘deserves a central role in country 
development and competitiveness strategies’; moreover, with every 
10% increase in penetration, broadband is associated with an addi-
tional 1.38% increase in GDP – a figure widely quoted in the subse-
quent literature. In the more recent report of the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU, 2012), the authors ‘validate the positive 
contribution of broadband to GDP growth for developing countries and 
regions’ and point to the ‘clear return to scale effect’. In countries with 
high broadband penetration, 1% growth in broadband penetration 
results in an increase of between 0.023 and 0.026% in GDP growth. In 
countries with low broadband penetration, the contribution to GDP 
growth ranges between 0.008 and 0.021%. Furthermore, the economic 
benefits of network coverage are not limited to growth: they are signifi-
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cant for creating employment as well. However, the ITU report (2013) 
also offers detailed analyses indicating that countries first need to build 
a critical mass – businesses capable of thriving in an Internet-enabled 
environment – in order to experience the benefits of network coverage. 
Building network capacity 
Dalberg (2013) points to the fact that ‘no vibrant Internet economies 
(...) have been built atop poor business environments’. Keys to a better 
business environment include not only the availability of the infra-
structure, but also the adequacy of backbone network infrastructure, 
network ownership and geographic patterns of network development 
(IC4D, 2009).  
Concerning backbone infrastructure, in sub-Saharan Africa, only 
12% of the infrastructure is fibre-optic cable (IC4D, 2009); the rest is 
microwave. Even if the share of fibre-optic varies across countries and 
operators, this overall low capacity is inadequate to support thriving 
mass market connectivity. The situation is ‘the opposite of that in more 
advanced markets, where fibre-optic backbone networks dominate and 
wireless technologies are used as backbone infrastructure primarily in 
remote and inaccessible areas.’ 
As regards ownership, vertical integration of businesses leads to low 
levels of competition over infrastructures: there is ‘little wholesale trad-
ing of backbone services’ (IC4D, 2009). This provides few incentives for 
operators to increase their delivery capacities; moreover, the ability to 
prevent other operators from using their own infrastructure prevents 
the markets from exploiting the economies of scale. 
Finally, as to the geographical distribution of services, and given the 
lack of competition and the high fixed costs of developing such net-
works, fibre-optic backbone networks are located mostly in or between 
urban areas. Arguments for or against ‘net neutrality’ aside,3 with most 
of the Internet content accessed by developing countries being located 
outside the region, greater demand for the Internet is likely to lead to 
increased development of network capacity towards other countries. 
There are therefore very few incentives for local actors to either 
build network capacity in mostly rural areas or to expand network cov-
erage. Development efforts need to focus on bridging this infrastructur-
al gap, as a key determinant in an enabling business environment. 
                                                          
3 Telcos worldwide – and especially among many developing countries – have lob-
bied for the ability to charge Internet companies (such as Google, Facebook and 
Netflix) selectively for their use of telcos’ networks. Within the developing world 
this discussion has distinct anti-colonial overtones, and is referred to as an Internet 
‘tax’.   
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Security and cybercrime 
Development efforts should also focus on the risks associated with cy-
bercrime, for three reasons. Firstly, the security/development nexus is 
increasingly recognized as a key component of both security and de-
velopment efforts. Secondly, CCB activities should have a deeper focus 
on cyber security, because the areas with the highest potential of eco-
nomic growth correspond roughly with those where the security risks 
are the highest. Thirdly, the skills developed locally through cyber se-
curity trainings correspond to those needed to enable local businesses 
to scale up, without having to rely on outside, more expensive talent. 
The security/development nexus 
The crucial importance of the security/development nexus is increas-
ingly recognized by the security and the development communities 
alike. As early as 1999, UK Secretary of State for International Devel-
opment, Clare Short, identified SSR as a prerequisite for sustainable 
development, and (in DCAF/ISSAT, 2012), the concept of SSR ‘explicit-
ly emphasized the linkages between security and development, 
prompting the development community to redefine its role in the field 
of security, while also highlighting the importance of security in the 
establishment of sustainable peace and development’. 
It is broadly acknowledged that SSR is: 
 ‘A Nationally-Owned process aimed at ensuring that security 
and justice providers deliver’: transposed to the cyber world, 
this expresses the need for methodological support to develop a 
National Cyber Security Framework relying for example on the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD 
COE) framework of Box 1. 
 ‘Effective and Efficient security and justice services that meet 
the people's needs’: transposed to the cyber world, this ex-
presses the need for technical support to develop CERT and Law 
Enforcement capabilities and their ability to cooperate. 
 ‘[Accountability of the security and justice providers] to the 
State and its people, operating within a framework of good gov-
ernance, rule of law and respect for human rights’: transposed 
to the cyber world, this calls for a broader methodological sup-
port not only addressing cyber issues but more broadly 
strengthening democratic governance, transparency and ac-
countability, in order to further the goals of CCB activities 
(DCAF/ISSAT, 2012). 
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Cyber security 
The principal Internet contributions to overall economic growth are 
also those most vulnerable to cybercrime. One survey (Dalberg, 2013) 
of 1300 business (among which nearly 1000 small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs)) in the developing world identified three main areas 
where it was crucial to address cyber security from the start:  
1. Backend systems (e.g. ERP systems such as SAP or similar) can 
unlock significant growth in helping SMEs as well as govern-
ment deal with management challenges. As Dalberg notes, ‘cost 
savings from enterprise systems, for example, have delivered 
30% savings for national health insurance schemes’. However, 
those enterprise systems concentrate the company's infor-
mation in one place, making it more vulnerable to potential 
hackers, who can steal vast quantities of data in one single 
hacking operation. Any move to a ‘paper-less office’, in gov-
ernment (‘e-government’) and in the private sector, must there-
fore place a high premium on cyber security.  
2. With higher-bandwidth intensive Internet solutions and the de-
creasing costs of mobile broadband plans – currently represent-
ing an impressive 11.3 to 24.7% of monthly gross national in-
come per capita – cloud-computing is likely to develop and fur-
ther this concentration of information. The deployment of 
cloud-based solutions for managing data and providing IT solu-
tions may lead to a ‘leapfrogging’ over certain more traditional 
ERP-system deployment – and the corresponding cyber security 
needs will be different.  
3. The spread of mobile money and eCommerce will provide an-
other incentive for thieves to develop cybercrime schemes. E-
banking theft is very much an issue in the developed world, but 
not yet in the developing world – and this gap will close with 
increased sophistication. Similarly, the deployment of innova-
tive mobile or Internet money approaches and more traditional 
credit or debit card-based e-commerce solutions has attracted 
online fraudsters. Online crime can greatly harm consumer 
trust; if not addressed, these security concerns could curtail de-
velopment in those sectors. Unlike in Europe and North Ameri-
ca, in the emerging markets both the services and the crime are 
being introduced simultaneously, so appropriate cybercrime 
legislation and measures must be in place from the very start. In 
Europe, ‘cybercrime legislation (…) was on few minds until 
fraud began.’ Today emerging markets do not have that luxury.  
Besides the three areas identified above, one further risk element can 
be noted: reputational. If a country or region becomes a noted haven 
for internationally-operating cybercriminals, it can suffer repercus-
sions, with greater difficulties in doing business abroad, and even an 
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impact on levels of FDI. Also, as a survey from Nigeria has shown (Citi-
zen Lab, 2013), cybercrime gangs are not above fleecing their own – 
especially when the international returns start to diminish. The study 
found that nearly half of all Nigerians claimed to have fallen victim to 
cybercrime, with financial repercussions, in 2012. The International 
Data Group Connect estimates that annually, cybercrimes cost the 
South African economy $573 million, the Nigerian economy $200 mil-
lion, and the Kenyan economy $36 million: money that these countries 
can ill afford to lose. Addressing cyber security issues is therefore cru-
cial from an early stage, before the costs associated with breaches slow 
down economic development. 
Evaluating the cost of cybercrime in developing countries is a chal-
lenge, mainly because ‘in the developing world (…) most governments 
do not collect any data on cybercrime at all’ (McAfee, 2014) This study 
reports figures from countries that currently track cybercrime within 
their borders: 0.14% for Colombia, 0.01% for Kenya, 0.18% for Malay-
sia, 0.08% for Nigeria, 0.14% for South Africa, 0.13% for Vietnam, 
0.19% for Zambia. These figures are extremely unlikely to be accurate; 
the same study averages losses for the developing world (including 
Nigeria) at around 0.2% of GDP (‘high-income countries lost more as a 
percent of GDP, perhaps as much as 0.9% on average’). Still, this needs 
to be compared with the results of the Nigerian survey quoted above, 
which calculated that in 2012 cybercrime had cost the Nigerian econ-
omy around USD 12 billion in total (The Citizen Lab, 2013). While 
these figures should be approached with caution, the discrepancies do 
give food for thought.  
Skills 
‘After access to high-bandwidth telecommunications infrastructure, the 
availability of employable talent is the single most important determi-
nant for the growth of the IT services and ITES (IT-Enabled Services) 
industries in the long term’ (IC4D, 2009). As McKinsey Global Institute 
reports quoted in (IC4D, 2009), based on a 2007 study in 28 develop-
ing countries: ‘on average, only about 13% of generalist graduates had 
the necessary qualifications (including language) for being employed 
in the sector.’ ‘Willingness to work in the industry’ and ‘Trainability’ 
are other key characteristics of the talent pool. These are skills that are 
enhanced by cyber security trainings, which thus serve the dual pur-
pose of enhancing cyber security as well as opening new economic op-
portunities for local businesses. 
A recurrent point noted in the interviews conducted for the present 
study is the importance of embedding cyber security skills early on, in 
the development phase. Indeed, much of the technical training provid-
ed by donor countries' CERTs aims at spreading the best practices of 
what can be called secure coding: teaching technical teams in partner 
countries to develop programmes and software that can minimize cyber 
security risks. In its 2010 research report, Carnegie Mellon's CERT® 
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identified secure coding as one of its main activities: working with 
‘software developers and software development organizations to re-
duce vulnerabilities resulting from coding errors before they are de-
ployed.’ 
A key shortcoming of a purely economic approach is that the ab-
sence of locally-owned infrastructures leads to international players 
dominating the market, providing few incentives to address the chal-
lenges mentioned above. Local economic actors benefit little from de-
velopment efforts when the infrastructure is not locally owned, as it is 
the international owners that capture most of the economic benefits. 
All reports stress the importance of relying on local providers, so that 
funding can stay in the partner-country economies, with a multiplier 
effect: money that remains in the local economies can then be re-used 
locally by those actors, promoting a virtuous economic circle. Donor 
countries need to view their benefits not only from an economic per-
spective, but from a political one as well. 
1.2 Encouraging openness and freedom on the Internet 
through enhanced participation in Internet governance 
The governance of the Internet is currently managed by self-organizing 
groups, with more or less equal weight to governments, the private 
sector and civil society. This approach has been called the Multi-
Stakeholder Model (MSM) and is supported by most liberal democra-
cies. However, other actors argue that state stability is paramount: they 
reject this model, calling for more power for governments, a view that 
can be described as towards cybersovereignty. The international dia-
logue over Internet issues has been polarized in the past few years be-
tween these two positions. 
At the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications 
(WCIT) in Dubai, sponsored by the ITU, debates on the future of Inter-
net governance saw, in the words of Alexander Klimburg (2014), ‘a 
mass of (mostly developing) countries following Russia's lead and vot-
ing for a text that seemed to leave the door open for greater government 
involvement in the running of the Internet. Eighty-nine countries 
signed the documents, which critics said was a significant threat to the 
multi-stakeholder approach’. To create the necessary conditions for 
greater engagement in Internet governance among developing coun-
tries, advocates of the MSM should build the capacity for partner coun-
tries to participate more fully in Internet governance and promote hu-
man rights, good governance and the rule of law, in order to foster lib-
eral democratic environments where all stakeholders can have incen-
tives to engage internationally. 
Building the capacity to participate fully in Internet governance 
To promote their political positions on a free and open Internet, MSM 
advocates need to be more aware of the incentives for developing coun-
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tries to support their views – not least, concerning the challenges of 
access and helping the developing countries to ‘realize the promise of 
the Internet’, as put by the Rwandan Minister of Telecommunications, 
Jean Nsengimana, at NETmundial in 2014. Supporting Internet capaci-
ty development through infrastructural, technical and social projects is 
the direct answer to questions of access. 
CCB should make it possible for such countries to participate more 
fully in the field of Internet governance. After all, it is in the interest of 
partner countries to support the MSM once the conditions for an ena-
bling business environment have been realized, based on the develop-
ment of capacities within the private sector and civil society. This is the 
virtuous circle of the open Internet, which can enable a better business 
environment, with the emergence of local actors who themselves have 
incentives to support the open Internet from which they derive value. 
Participating in Internet governance is largely a logistics question –
for civil society as well as governmental actors. The many physical 
meetings involved – often spread across the globe – and the often ar-
cane technical issues rule out engaging only ‘part-time’ in this space. 
Both governments and civil society actors in the developing world are 
often challenged by the inability to provide full-time staff and meet 
their logistic (travel) needs. This is clearly an area where donor coun-
tries can accomplish much, at relatively low cost.  
Promoting human rights, good governance and the rule of law 
Another political goal of CCB should be to promote the rule of law, 
good governance and human rights, which are likely to enable better 
business environments as well as leading to increased cooperation in 
Internet governance. As Maria Grazia Porcedda has noted (EUISS, 
2011): ‘human rights and good governance (...) as well as cyber securi-
ty can be fostered by reshaping cyberspace in accordance with interna-
tionally endorsed principles of the rule of law’. Those conditions are 
crucial for the realization of economic growth, and they are at the heart 
of many of the CCB models that have already been established. 
The EU's cyber security strategy (JOIN, 2013) emphasizes these is-
sues. Putting access for all at the centre (‘Everyone should be able to 
access the Internet and to an unhindered flow of information’), it estab-
lishes three international goals: ‘promote openness and freedom (...), 
encourage efforts to develop norms of behaviour and apply existing 
laws in cyberspace. The EU will also work towards closing the digital 
divide, and will actively participate in international efforts to build 
cyber security capacity.’ On this last point of capacity building, the 
strategy adds that ‘the EU will contribute (…) by intensifying the (...) 
international efforts to strengthen Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection (CIIP) cooperation networks’, which also addresses the eco-
nomic issues mentioned earlier. 
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Our arguments in favour of CCB therefore rely not only on economic 
considerations, but also on a political narrative supporting an open 
and free Internet – similar to the strategy developed by the EU. Howev-
er, to help foster the conditions for a new generation of liberal democ-
racies to appear, these institutions now need to act on their promises 
and promote access to Internet governance discussions for all stake-
holders in developing countries, at the governmental, corporate and 
societal levels. 
The prospective gains for donor countries go beyond the political 
realm. A focus on cyber security in the development programmes of 
partner nations will also have positive externalities in terms of interna-
tional norms that can lead to higher levels of cyber security. The Inter-
net has no borders (yet), so achieving greater security in partner coun-
tries will yield cyber security results in donor countries as well. Further, 
it will help to curtail the growth of cyber-theft, already a major cause of 
risks for governments and private companies alike. 
1.3 Enhancing security among donor and partner countries 
through coalitions of like-minded states 
In a study for the OECD, it was noted that ‘Vulnerabilities in software 
developed in one country and installed in a second can be exploited 
remotely from a third’ (OECD/IFP, 2011). Cyberspace ignores interna-
tional borders and allows anyone anywhere to attack anyone anywhere 
else. A compromised device (computer, mobile, wearable device) in, 
say, Malaysia (or Germany, or Kenya…) can be used to attack a comput-
er in Washington DC, with the true attacker remaining hidden. Cyber-
criminal gangs (like the legendary Nigerian 419-scammers) can wage 
international campaigns that know no borders, while avoiding prose-
cution because their own governments lack the necessary resources. 
Attackers aiming at more lucrative targets in the governments and pri-
vate sector of the industrialized world might first seek to compromise 
partners in the developing world. The potential list is unending, but the 
point is simple: mitigating against such cyber-risks often requires gov-
ernments in the developing world to have two principal capabilities. 
Firstly, well-developed national standards for information assurance 
purposes, with legal requirements on specific critical infrastructure to 
take basic minimal precautions, such as the use of basic cyber security 
products or similar. Secondly, the ability to respond operationally (as-
sisted by CERT or similar organizations) to international requests for 
assistance in dealing with cyber security issues, both from the security 
services and the wider community itself.  
Neither of these capabilities can be developed in a vacuum: they are 
influenced and formed by various interests, many of which show 
breaks along ideological and political lines. There are significant differ-
ences between how the ‘West’ in general sees the Internet, and how 
countries such as Russia and China see it. What is often agreed upon at 
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a technical/operational level gets abstracted into ‘norms’ at the policy 
level.  
There have been repeated attempts to formulate global norms on the 
rights and responsibilities of states as regards cyberspace, such as the 
recent push for peacetime international rules of the road under discus-
sion in the UN Group of Government Experts (UN GGE) and within re-
gional forums such as the OSCE and ASEAN. They are also very much a 
topic of bilateral discussion, as seen in April 2015 when a factsheet 
released by the White House on US–Japan cooperation affirmed:  
‘States should uphold additional, voluntary norms of State behavior 
in cyberspace during peacetime, [...] States should not conduct or 
knowingly support online activity that intentionally damages critical 
infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use of critical infrastructure to 
provide services to the public […] the United States and Japan commit 
to continued discussions to identify specific peacetime cyber norms, 
noting that wide affirmation among States would contribute to interna-
tional stability in cyberspace.’ (White House, 2015) 
However, significant differences remain between liberal democratic 
countries and less democratic governments around the world. While 
previously these discussions (such as within the UN Group of Govern-
ment Experts) were seen as being similar to nuclear non-proliferation 
discussions – i.e. of interest only to a small elite – the ‘militarization’ of 
cyberspace has not stopped at the developing world, with over 130 
countries currently developing military cyber-programmes. This has 
been respected in these discussion forums, which have been greatly 
expanded to include actors from the developing world. The discussion 
has become a global one, with greatly differing ‘sides’ to the narrative – 
and many ‘swing votes’ to gather.  
The norm development process can occur along two different lines – 
‘universal norms’ that will be binding for all, or a ‘like-minded’ group 
of states that seeks to pursue a deeper level of cooperation and en-
forcement of agreed norms. While the first is the preferred option, the 
second seems the more likely outcome – at least in the short term.  
First option: universal norms 
Roger Hurwitz (2014) argues, ‘States have agreed on the need for 
norms as a means to restrain disruptive behaviors in cyberspace and 
their negative impact on international security’. However, as he also 
points out, cyberspace has inner differences with the offline world and 
there is a need to craft new norms to fit those differences. The first 
round of such norms could include the duty to assist international in-
vestigation, the duty to prevent attacks emanating from a state's territo-
ry and restrict the recruitment and use of third parties (proxies, merce-
naries) to commit wrongful acts.  
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Those norms would curtail the abilities of non-state actors to commit 
cyber-attacks, and states would be in charge of crafting and enforcing 
them on a territorial basis. That is the observation of the (OECD, 2012): 
‘International co-operation and the need for better alliances and part-
nerships with like-minded countries or allies, including facilitating 
capacity building of less developed countries are (...) key objectives’. 
There are two problems about this ideal view of states agreeing on 
universal norms. First, it ignores corporate and civil society actors, 
whose incentives might differ from those of states, notably on issues of 
security and national security. Second, enforcing norms rejected by the 
private sector and civil society will be harder, precisely because these 
stakeholders stand to gain so much from a free and open Internet. This 
explains why many of the cyber security frameworks in the USA have 
been developed in partnership with the private sector, such as National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) framework for cyber 
security (NIST, 2014). 
The second issue with state-centric vision of norm-building is that 
states might not be able to reach such agreements (Goldsmith, 2012). 
Indeed, there is a lack of mutual interest for states to engage in this 
kind of norm-building. Firstly, because fundamental asymmetry of of-
fensive cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities mean that different states 
face different levels of incentives for engaging in norm-building pro-
cesses, and the incentives of each state are hard to read. Secondly, a 
lack of clear definitions of the boundaries between sectors (such as 
cyber-attack and cyber-exploitation) are constantly shifting, so it is 
unclear how states could agree on them before negotiating on cyber 
norms. 
Moreover, states tend to employ dual standards in evaluating 
threats and activities, according to their origin a ‘threat’ or ‘activity’ in 
a partner country is evaluated differently from one perceived to origi-
nate in a country with which the diplomatic ties are less firm. 
Even less likely is going beyond norms to actual treaties – like those 
defined by arms treaties – due to the obvious dual-use nature of virtual-
ly everything in cyberspace, as well as the impossibility of monitoring 
any agreement. The ‘absence of a dependable verification regime will 
kill a security treaty – even if other hurdles to cooperation (…) are over-
come’ (Goldsmith, 2012). This question of enforcement is paramount, 
precisely because cyber weapons are fundamentally different from oth-
er kinds of weapons.  
Until those issues are acknowledged and overcome, we hold, states 
should try to build norms not through globally-inclusive coalitions but 
through a more focused coalition of like-minded states. 
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Second option: enforcement through a coalition of like-minded states 
Assuming that only a group of like-minded states will, initially, abide 
by the entire set of norms, Jack Goldsmith argues that ‘all States should 
be subject to at least some of them’ and that ‘other States will come to 
accept and observe these norms as a consequence of persuasion, confi-
dence-building measures, incentives or sanctions employed by the like-
minded States’. The idea is that this coalition of like-minded states, 
upon reaching a critical mass, will be able to spread the agreed-upon 
norms through persuasive or non-persuasive international engage-
ment. 
The UK’s Cyber Security Strategy fully recognizes the need for such 
regional measures. Its objective 3 – an ‘open, vibrant and stable cyber-
space’ – includes the need to encourage ‘international and regional 
organisations to support capacity building’. The goal is to develop 
models for international law within the Commonwealth, support tech-
nical training with the ITU and engage the Council of Europe or the 
OSCE in protecting freedom of expression online. This strategy inte-
grates the full range of available means for norm-building, from legal 
and binding agreements such as international law to non-legal and 
non-binding confidence-building measures. This shows that our two 
options are not incompatible – indeed, to spur their effect, states 
should be pursuing a mixed strategy. 
CCB projects, through engagement with all the relevant stakehold-
ers, present a formidable opportunity for donor countries to use their 
soft power. They should be one of the key programmes used for spread-
ing the norms of like-minded states to partner countries. 
Bilateral development and the role of security services and infrastruc-
ture programmes  
Beyond relatively abstract deliberations on norms, the technical and 
political reality is that CCB programmes can also have very practical 
application for the security interests of donor nations. Successful CCB 
programmes can lead to further cooperation between the military and 
security services of both sides – beyond the scope of what would nor-
mally be called CCB, and more in line with ‘mil-mil’ or intelligence 
sharing.  
As repeatedly mentioned in our interviews (see Box 3 and Box 4 be-
low), CCB activities are an opportunity for cyber-incident responders to 
create a global network of relations which in turn can foster coopera-
tion between the agencies where they work. Engaging early in CCB ac-
tivities will allow donor countries to create a similar security environ-
ment in partner countries. This similarity in the structures of security 
services will promote more efficient cooperation: it will be easier for an 
incident response team in the UK that detects a cyber-attack emanating 
from Ghana to tackle this attack if the structure of the incident response 
team in Accra is similar to their own. That being said, however, a donor 
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nation might receive operational benefits of cooperation from a partner 
nation even without the latter knowing it.  
A recurrent story in the Western media has concerned how China is 
‘taking over the Internet in Africa’ – largely by installing subsidized 
Chinese Huawei and ZTE routers in key Internet backbone locations. 
While some of these activities are understandable market moves as part 
of an ‘African telco gold rush’, this has not halted speculations at to 
other benefits China might derive from having such a controlling posi-
tion on the physical layer of the African Internet. 
Although this aspect is partially unproven, it should be acknowl-
edged that, from a ‘hard power’ security perspective, there are theoreti-
cal advantages to be derived from such a position. CCB, although over-
whelmingly a tool of ‘soft power’, may have repercussions that are di-
rectly relevant to harder security concerns. 
2. Segmentation of CCB activities 
As countries begin developing cyber security strategies, they also begin 
upping the funds dedicated to Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB). 
With this increase has come a growing academic interest in such pro-
grammes. Building on the literature of Capacity Building, research ef-
forts have been working on segmenting CCB activities across several 
sectors. The recent study by the European Union Institute for Security 
Studies (EUISS, 2014) presents several of those strategies, with an 
overview of approaches for fostering more efficient CCB activities. 
In this section, based on the series of interviews we conducted and 
the rationale we have provided, we adopt four categories to describe 
the support that donor countries can provide in terms of CCB. 
1. Methodological support consists of general concepts used for 
building local capacities, as well as basic research into how CCB 
works. 
2. Technical support focuses on training around the CERT/CSIRT 
structures, the help provided at law-enforcement level and sup-
port for community-based instruments. 
3. Infrastructural support offers examples of successful infrastruc-
tural projects. 
4. Finally, we examine efficient ways for donor countries to pro-
vide budgetary support, especially as regards support through 
international organizations or directly to civil society. 
2.1 Methodological support: models and options for part-
ner countries 
The concept of ‘methodological support’ concerns not only delivering 
models, but includes all policy options available to governments con-
sidering CCB activities. As regards the idea of creating overarching 
methods, two main approaches have been examined and reviewed – 
one highly descriptive and encompassing, the second more general and 
focused on security aspects.  
Oxford GCSCC: Five dimensions of CCB activities 
In early 2015, the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre at Oxford re-
leased the first version of its framework, the Cyber Security Capability 
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Maturity Model (CMM).4 It aims at increasing the scale and effective-
ness of cyber security capacity building, measuring those capacities 
with five levels of advancement (start-up, formative, established, stra-
tegic and dynamic) along five dimensions: 
 devising cyber policy and strategy 
 encouraging responsible cyber culture within society 
 building cyber skills into the workforce and leadership 
 creating effective legal and regulatory frameworks 
 controlling risks through organization, standards and technol-
ogy 
Each of these five dimensions, with their subcategories, and their re-
spective ‘maturity’ (level of sophistication) has been broken down into 
225 individual descriptions. This level of detail is both an advantage 
and a risk: at times the descriptive text seems overly simplistic, espe-
cially at higher levels of ‘maturity’.  
Only the first dimension – ‘devising cyber policy and strategy’ – 
seems to concentrate on actual cyber security, with some strong sup-
port from the fourth dimension (legal frameworks). Overall, of the 20-
odd subcategories (one sub-category without content is presumably a 
work in progress) only some six to eight have a direct bearing on tradi-
tional understandings of national cyber security. The others concen-
trate on other important societal aspects clearly relevant for issues of 
national security, such as ‘mind-sets’ and education.  
Establishing a maturity model for an issue as complex as national 
cyber security capabilities will always be a difficult and perhaps also 
unachievable task. While ideas of a ‘capability model’ have been used 
in the last decade in some types of management consulting (including 
in evaluating software development), they are less often applied to 
such complex and non-linear concepts as national strategies, or capa-
bilities. The primary challenge will always be the perception of an 
overtly normative approach – applying and promoting a certain set of 
values or standards, and putting them in qualitative ranking to each 
other (with some ‘less developed’, others ‘more developed’.) On the 
other hand, it can be argued that, since all approaches are at least 
somewhat normative, this may be a rather moot point. In this case, 
however, it is important that the underlying evaluations/descriptions 
be as detailed as possible. As the current version of the GCSCC Model is 
                                                          
4  Available at: https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/gcscc-
cyber-security-capability-maturity-model-cmm [Accessed 8 June 2015]. 
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still partially a draft, future versions may well address these open ques-
tions.  
EUISS: Four pillars of CCB activities  
The EUISS approach (2014) focuses much more on actual security is-
sues in CCB. Taking the standard cyber security incident response 
model as the point of departure,5 the EUISS transposes this industry 
standard approach to the security/development nexus. The EUISS ar-
ranges CCB into four stages of concrete security objectives and four 
pillars of actions aimed at developing local cyber security capability. 
The concrete security objectives are: 
 Prevention: Addressing man-made risks associated with cyber-
space. This includes investigating the causes of cybercrime, 
raising awareness on cyber security risks, addressing vulnera-
bilities and coordinating national policies. 
 Protection: Collaboration between private and public actors, 
aimed at reducing the impact of cyber-accidents. This includes 
developing appropriate CERT structures, legislation, standards, 
risk assessments, and joint exercises, to promote efficient and 
well-governed collaboration. 
 Pursuit: Relying on responsibility assessment for the liability 
and potential sanctions following cyber-attacks: especially cru-
cial in criminal cases. This includes having frameworks in place 
for information sharing, understanding the threat and ensuring 
the cooperation of various authorities with international legal 
instruments. 
 Response: Minimizing and managing the negative consequenc-
es of a cyber-attack, relying heavily on a CERT/CSIRT and con-
tact points available round the clock. 
Common to all four objectives is the development of cyber resilience. 
As noted by Elena Kvochko (EUISS, 2014), ‘the risk from major cyber 
events could significantly slow the pace of technological innovation 
over the coming decade’ and ‘a backlash against digitisation could 
leave as much as US$3.06 trillion of (...) value unrealised’. From that 
perspective, traditional approaches to cyber security are ex post; they 
fail to involve businesses, require talent that is scarce and expensive, 
and rely on technological innovations – leaving customers and em-
ployees as the vulnerable weakest links.  
                                                          
5  See for instance 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf 
(p.21) [Accessed: 10 June 2015]. 
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The EUISS authors advocate ‘cyber resilience’, without indicating 
how it could look (or does look) in practice. Firstly, they mention that 
risk markets (i.e. insurance products) seem to offer an opportunity for 
evaluating and ensuring against the risk of cyber-attacks. The mere 
existence of a risk market offers business opportunities to those who 
are better able to evaluate those risks, which is a first step before being 
able to offer the right set of insurance contracts against them. However, 
the EUISS study fails to consider that it has been the consistent failure 
of those markets to get established that has prompted a ‘creeping’ ap-
proach to mandating critical infrastructure protection (CIP) measures. 
Secondly, the authors advocate research on embedding security into 
the early stages of software development. While this seems to offer 
promising avenues for heightening the overall reliability of security 
systems (and is increasingly part of CCB programmes), the problem is 
the level of specificity – for instance, CERTs teaching each other about 
how to securely code SIEMs and other technical systems will not ad-
dress the wider and pervasive problems of poor security in the industry.  
The four EUISS pillars for building national and regional capacities 
are: 
● Concepts and strategies: Determining what needs to be protect-
ed and how, and protecting the economic gains of a connected 
business environment seem to be a ‘key driver for cyber security 
efforts’, but sovereignty or particular ethical and cultural values 
might also broaden the scope of what needs to be protected. 
● Laws and policies: Developing normative frameworks is itself 
part of a CCB exercise, as well as legal capacity-building activi-
ties. Internationally endorsed principles such as the rule of law 
can contribute the reshaping of cyberspace to foster human 
rights, good governance (understood as ‘law-making based on 
the participation of all potential recipient and openness’) and 
cyber security (EUISS, 2014). The legal dimension of cyber se-
curity activities has focused especially on 
• data protection and human rights (based on the 
European Convention of Human Rights and UN discus-
sions on the right to privacy in the digital age),  
• substantive criminal law (based on the Budapest 
Convention) 
• international binding or non-binding normative 
framework for state behaviour (based on Article 51 of 
the UN Charter and international humanitarian law).  
 
● Organization: CCB includes the development of the structures 
corresponding to a national cyber security strategy and other 
structures as CERTs responsible for coordinating national cy-
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bersecurity among all involved actors (intelligence agencies, 
regulators, law enforcement agencies and defence ministries) 
● Implementation: CCB programmes require budget, skills (de-
veloped through training, education and awareness), techno-
logical equipment (physical infrastructure) as well as coordina-
tion (through public–private partnerships for example, or in-
formation-sharing and analysis centres that act as information 
clearing houses) 
Further methodological support for national cyber security 
The models described above are attempts to deliver CCB programmes, 
or to evaluate the overall state of a country’s national cyber security 
status. For governmental organizations considering both how to target 
and evaluate the impact of such a strategy, these models can be help-
ful. However, it is important to note that there are other methodologies 
that have been used to provide input into many national cyber security 
strategies, some with considerable influence. Both the NATO CCD COE 
‘National Cyber Security Framework Manual’ and the ITU ‘National 
Cyber Security Guide’ are documents that have been used by develop-
ing countries to help formulate and plan their own individual national 
approaches to cyber security. As noted in section 1.3 above, the compe-
tition of political ideology also translates into differing strategic and 
operational approaches at the norms level, and the NATO and the ITU 
documents are emblematic of the differing general approaches.  
The differences are even starker as regards international agreements 
with strong practical application. For instance, the Budapest Conven-
tion on Cyber Crime is by far the most widely accepted international 
agreement with cyber security implications in current use. It provides 
effective guidelines on how to set up law enforcement and criminal 
prosecution systems; therefore, countries which adhere to the Conven-
tion are much more likely to cooperate effectively with each other on 
cyber security incidents. However, several countries – most important-
ly Russia and China, but also Brazil and India and others – have reject-
ed the Budapest Convention. Russia and China have sought to provide 
a counter-document with the International Code of Conduct on Infor-
mation Security, and have pursued an international strategy dedicated 
to its promotion. These documents are very different – also in scope 
and application – but both have the same aim: to convince signatories 
to adhere to a particular vision of national cyber security. The methodo-
logical relevance of these documents cannot be ignored: they some-
times represent the most important guides for developing countries.  
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BOX 1: The National Cyber Security Framework Manual  
These objectives and areas are all captured in the NATO CCD COE–sponsored 
National Cyber Security Framework Manual (2012), where Klimburg and oth-
ers argue that the development of national cyber security programmes doc-
trines need to take into consideration five ‘mandates’ that account for various 
differing approaches (see below). These five mandates all have roles and re-
sponsibilities derived from the industry-standard Cyber Security Response 
Model (pro-action, prevention, preparation, response, recovery, and after-
care/follow-up) The development of these strategies should centre around 
various ‘dimensions’ – Whole-of-Government ‘coordination’ on mandates, 
Whole-of-System ‘cooperation’ on international issues in a like-to-like context, 
and a Whole-of-Nation ‘collaboration’ approach aimed at convincing local 
(national) actors to engage in activities conducive to supporting national cyber 
security. While every governmental system has its own political realities to 
address, each will have various dilemmas it needs to solve, and that will de-
pend on specific local conditions.  
 
National Cyber Security 
(NCS)  
Defined  
 
‘The focused application of specific governmental levers 
and information assurance principles to public, private 
and relevant international ICT systems, and their associ-
ated content, where these systems directly pertain to na-
tional security.’  
 
The 5 Mandates  
Different  
interpretations of NCS & 
common activities  
 
– Military Cyber  
– Counter Cyber Crime  
– Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence  
– Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Crisis 
Management  
– Cyber Diplomacy and Internet Governance  
+ 3 ‘Cross Mandates’: coordination, information exchange 
and data protection, research & development and educa-
tion  
 
 
The 3 Dimensions  
Different stakeholder 
groups in NCS  
 
– Governmental (central, state, local) – ‘coordination’  
– National (CIP/contactors, security companies, civil 
society) – ‘co-operation’  
– International (legal, political and industry frameworks) 
– ‘collaboration’  
 
 
The 5 Dilemmas  
Balancing the cost and 
benefits of NCS  
 
– Stimulate the Economy vs. Improve National Security  
– Infrastructure Modernisation vs. Critical Infrastructure 
Protection  
– Private Sector vs. Public Sector  
– Data Protection vs. Information Sharing  
– Freedom of Expression vs. Political Stability  
 
(source: National Cyber Security Framework Manual, 2012) 
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BOX 2: The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest 
Convention) 
 
The Council of Europe Convention on cybercrime (the Budapest Convention) is 
the only widespread convention to address definitions and practices in dealing 
with cybercrime. Opened for signature in 2001, it entered into force in 2004 
after ratification by five countries including three member-states of the Council 
of Europe. It has since been ratified by 46 countries, and signed but not 
ratified by an additional eight. 
 
The Budapest Convention is not a treaty, but a methodological framework for 
help in designing mutually compatible legislation on cybercrime. It defines 
appropriate measures for substantive criminal law to be taken for offences 
against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and 
systems, for computer- and content-related offences as well as for 
infringements of copyrights and related rights. It also defines the procedural 
frameworks needed for dealing with those offences (common provisions, 
preservation of stored data, production orders, search and seizure, real-time 
collection of data) and tries to tackle jurisdictional issues. Finally, it sets a 
framework for international cooperation including mutual assistance and a 
round the clock point of contact for immediate assistance in investigating, 
proceedings or collecting evidence. 
 
As such, it is a truly unique document which can go far in helping 
governments find a common basis on which to communicate on cybercrime 
related issues. As it is very difficult for countries to be able to engage in any 
kind of cooperation on this issue without having acceded to the Convention – 
or to implement its measures without being a signatory – its importance as a 
methodological tool for CCB cannot be overstated. 
2.2 Technical support for Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT), law enforcement, Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) and community-based instruments 
Support for CERTs/CSIRTs 
CERT/CSIRT structures are vital operational components of cyber secu-
rity, and various documents have been prepared to help partner coun-
tries develop their own CERT/CSIRTs. After publishing, as early as 
2006, a step-by-step approach on how to set up a CSIRT (ENISA, 2006), 
the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA) memorably described CSIRTs as ‘a fire brigade (...) the only 
ones which can react when security incidents occur’ (ENISA, 2008). 
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This description is too modest (highlighting only the life-saving func-
tions of CERTs): more than just a ‘fire brigade’, CERTs are akin to insur-
ance, building-code supervisors, and law enforcement investigators.  
However, if early approaches focused on sectoral CSIRTs, national 
CSIRTs have since received greater attention as states developed their 
understanding and research on cyber security, Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), and increasingly on national crisis 
management issues. 
BOX 3: From an interview with Koichiro Komiyama, Deputy Director of Global 
Coordination Division and Manager of Enterprise Support Group of the 
JPCERT/CC, and Member of the Board of Directors of Forum of Incident Re-
sponse and Security Teams (FIRST)  
The JPCERT/CC is a non-profit NGO, but its budget is mostly covered by the 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). It is responsible for 
protecting Japanese Internet users, including infrastructures within the nation-
al CIP framework. Their work in cyber capacity building has focused on CSIRT 
establishment at the national and regional levels, as well as workshops on 
secure coding.  
 In terms of CSIRT establishment, JPCERT/CC are seeking to build national or-
ganizations and have been working with FIRST to draft a model for CCB activi-
ties by CSIRTs that they will then enrich with their experience on the ground. 
They recognize that their work is facilitated by the development of regional 
CSIRTs that organize and promote the collaboration at their own level. In the 
absence of regional CSIRTs in either the Pacific or African regions, they are 
working with individual countries like Tanzania and Fiji to foster their leader-
ship in the creation and development of regional entities. 
The strategy for their training is organized in three areas: why is it in the inter-
est of partner countries to care about CSIRTs and cyber security? what is a 
CSIRT? (with examples of CSIRTs that have proven useful) and how to build a 
CSIRT, including a focus on operational issues. 
Occasional workshops are arranged, especially on secure coding. This is a dual-
use measure that both increases the local pool of technical skills and is also a 
way of introducing local researchers to the global community, to facilitate trust 
and create a network of personal relations in the field of cyber security. 
 
The debate on what constitutes a ‘national’ CERT can be a vexing ques-
tion. The OSCE – within the context of developing the IWG 1039 norm 
package – spent significant amounts of time on this issue, and commu-
nity-based organizations such as FIRST have also started to try to de-
fine the difference between government-mandated ‘national’ CERTs 
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and others. There are significant differences in the capabilities of 
CERTs: they can range from NOC/SOC configurations with ability to 
‘pull the plug’ if needed, to purely advisory components with limited 
operational roles. Some ‘national’ CERTs are tasked only with defend-
ing government networks (if allowed: many governmental CERTs can-
not override decisions taken by sectoral CERTs) while some have a truly 
national role, directly helping to protect their countries’ critical infra-
structure. The only key component that all ‘national’ CERTs must have 
is the ability to serve as an authorized point of contact for technical 
issues – for major incidents, but much more likely for the day-to-day 
fight against cybercrime. This category includes much of what may be 
construed as state-supported cyber-espionage. 
BOX 4: From an interview with Eunju Pak (Deputy Researcher at the 
KrCERT/CC and Senior Research Associate at the Korea Information Security 
Agency) 
The KrCERT/CC is under the authority of the Korean Internet & Security 
Agency, in turn under the Korean Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning 
– from which their funding comes exclusively. The CCB team belongs to the 
Incident Response Division, and it is their duty under various international 
cooperation programmes to engage in CCB, in order to establish reliable rela-
tionships among CSIRTs in the Asia-Pacific region. 
They achieve those goals mainly through the five-day training course at 
APISC (Asia Pacific Information Security Center) based on TRANSITS I (Train-
ing of Network Security Incident Team Staff), a regular training course devel-
oped by the TERENA (Trans-European Research and Education Networking 
Association) for establishing and operating a CSIRT. This TRANSITS course 
covers organizational, technical, operational and legal issues, in two steps: 
1. TRANSITS-I6 is ‘aimed at new or potential CSIRT personnel who wish to 
gain a good grounding in the main aspects of working in an incident 
handling and response team.’ 
2. TRANSITS-II7 is ‘aimed at more experienced personnel working for 
established CSIRTs. It provides in-depth study of key areas in incident 
handling and response operations, training in how to improve 
communications with constituents, along with practical exercises. 
 
  
                                                          
6  https://www.terena.org/activities/transits/transits-i/ 
7  https://www.terena.org/activities/transits/transits-ii/ 
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Support for law enforcement 
Increasingly CERT/CSIRT issues are overlapping with wider cases of 
law enforcement (LE) cooperation. Where technical cooperation pro-
grammes are offered by a donor nation, they often address issues such 
as computer and network forensics or procedures for engaging in MLAT 
(Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties) – all critical issues when dealing 
with cybercrime. The reason for this overlap between LE and CERT ac-
tivities is probably a practical one: national CERT activities are often 
closely connected to those of LE.  
In the fight against cybercrime (ENISA, 2012), the CERTs and LE are 
‘paramount and indispensable players’, hence the goal of improving 
the ‘capability of CERTs (...) to address the network and information 
security (NIS) aspects of cybercrime’. The ENISA report concludes that 
it is ‘undoubtedly important for [LE] teams to know that they can count 
on the expertise of a CERT team for assistance in handling certain cas-
es’. 
That being said, organizing specific LE-related activities is often 
quite politically contentious, and can involve a range of programmes 
and procedures. CERTs activities represent a practical and less-
contentious method for donor countries to engage with the security 
services of various countries. The most obvious reason for CERTs to be 
engaged in the space is simply ‘community building’: among first re-
sponders, there is a strong belief in the importance of informal net-
works to facilitate not only information sharing, but also incident re-
sponse. Addressing the needs of partner nations is therefore seen as a 
crucial step in building mutual trust within the all-important communi-
ty networks.  
Support to community-based instruments and ISPs 
Given sufficient technical capabilities, the operational activities of 
CERTs often require live feeds about cyber activities, important primari-
ly for identifying what is 'bad' on the Internet, and further forensic ac-
tivities that can be useful in the usual CERT context but also for LE pur-
poses. Those instruments are described extensively in ENISA (2011), 
where the goal was to ‘investigate ways in which CERTs (...) proactively 
detect incidents concerning their constituencies’. Proactive detection of 
incidents is there defined as ‘the process of discovery of malicious ac-
tivity in a CERT's constituency through internal monitoring tools or 
external services (...) before the affected constituents become aware of 
the problem’. Those external services are almost entirely community-
based resources.  
Such resources may be public, closed or commercial, but in all cases 
they can be shared by multiple cyber security responders in a largely 
apolitical way (some may require ‘some form of vetting of the recipient’ 
of the feed, or a subscription fee). Besides the private sector, many of 
these instruments are developed and maintained at the level of civil 
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society: the ENISA report notes that they are ‘run by various security 
organisations, projects, vendors, universities, CERTs or non-profit initi-
atives, or even enthusiastic individuals’.  
Examples of such businesses include the Shadowserver Founda-
tion,
8
 an organization of ‘volunteer security professionals around the 
world […] seeking to provide timely and relevant information to the 
security community at large’, and Spamhouse, a long-established pro-
ject that provides up-to-date list of ‘bad Internet domains’ and spam 
groups that other organizations can then block for malicious traffic. 
The community is even engaged in building physical infrastructure: 
Packet Clearing House, for instance, builds and manages various Inter-
net eXchange Points around the world (IXPs). (see Box 5) 
However, as mentioned in the interview (Box 5), the number of 
CERTs in partner countries with technical capabilities for exploiting 
such feeds is limited. Therefore, the development of localized commu-
nity-based instruments, albeit crucial for a sustainable healthy cyber-
space constituency, might require initial CCB activities with technical 
training of CERT and LE teams. That makes it more meaningful to first 
support the work of existing community-based instruments, and, 
where necessary, their expansion to include further geographic areas 
(for instance, in sub-Saharan Africa). Localized (partner-country) initia-
tives should be supported wherever possible, but in the short term it is 
essential to ensure that the partner CERTs and similar organizations are 
in a position to exploit the resources available.  
2.3 Infrastructural support: development of economic infra-
structure 
Physical infrastructures are crucial for economic development. As we 
already mentioned, a 10% increase in broadband penetration is associ-
ated with an additional 1.38% increase in GDP (IC4D, 2009). Moreover, 
countries with higher broadband penetration typically experience 
0.023–0.026% in GDP growth for each 1% growth in broadband pene-
tration; by contrast, for countries with low broadband penetration, the 
contribution to GDP growth ranges between 0.008 and 0.021% (ITU, 
2012). 
Physical infrastructures also increase the demand for technical 
skills. Therefore infrastructural support must be coupled with activities 
aimed at increasing the local supply of technical skills — such as train-
ing activities. 
Different models for infrastructural support 
The World Economic Forum (WEF, 2015) has provided a list of operat-
ing models that emerging markets are experimenting with, and a list of 
                                                          
8  https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/ 
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factors which can help in determining which are appropriate in various 
contexts: 
● Infrastructure sharing: Reduces the profitability gap and can be 
done at multiple levels. For instance, tower sharing is common 
in India; and passive network-sharing agreements are common 
in Bangladesh after the government mandated the signing of 
such agreements. 
● Government subsidies for rural rollouts: Compatible with ‘last 
mile’ competition between operators. The WEF reports mixed 
results, with 64 national funds established for universal service 
but very few of them actually making use of their full budget. 
● Rural wholesale network:  Funded partially or fully by gov-
ernments, then provided without discrimination to mobile op-
erators, a level playing field for competition at the retail level. 
WEF reports that governments have not been good network op-
erators and that these networks may ‘hamper innovation if not 
actual coverage’. 
● Private investment and other innovative approaches: Private 
firms like Facebook or Google have incentives for developing 
coverage in partner countries if they expect to extract economic 
benefits from the newly covered populations. Initiatives like In-
ternet.org (Facebook) or Project Loon (Google) have been de-
veloped precisely to fill in this gap. However, it is unclear 
whether the services provided are backed up by sufficient local 
capabilities so that partner countries are sustainably connected 
to an open and secure Internet. 
In all these cases, a crucial decision has to be made by local govern-
ments. The WEF report lists potential priorities according to environ-
ment (rural/urban) and wealth (moderate or low GDP per capita) crite-
ria. Beyond choosing a model for extending coverage, governments 
also have to encourage the use of infrastructure to trigger the associat-
ed economic benefits. 
The role of local governments 
Local governments can play three main roles (Dalberg, 2013): 
● Government as a visionary fostering good leadership can define 
a national strategy for the Internet and ICT use. This sends an 
important signal to stakeholders and is also a practical way to 
align a diverse set of national actors. 
● Government as a catalyst of good governance can create an en-
vironment within which actors can invest and collaborate 
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around the use of the Internet. This is a role that no other local 
actor can take on, with the same level of efficiency.  
● Government as a first adopter and promoter can make the first 
use of the Internet's various capabilities. This is crucial to wider 
national usage and to realization of the impact of infrastructur-
al developments. 
In the roles mentioned above, results stem from a thriving ecosystem of 
locally-owned businesses. In that sense, encouraging local ownership 
may entail economic losses for Western companies but will yield politi-
cal gains that offset these losses. Local ownership also feeds our other 
segments, by increasing the demand for local technical personnel and 
providing the terrain for the implementation of the methodologies men-
tioned. Local ownership was also an issue mentioned in the interview 
with JPCERT/CC (see Box 3): since there are no private actors able to 
capture the economic benefits that would be produced, there are few 
incentives for partner countries to engage in these projects. ICT is a 
source of local economic growth not only in Africa; it is also a source of 
economic growth for multinational companies that are developing in 
Africa. And the fact that submarine cables are owned by multinational 
companies generates economic benefits for the owners of the subma-
rine cables, rather than for partner countries.  
However, the incentives of both governments and multinational 
companies can be mixed. To be efficient and sustainable, infrastructur-
al support must be linked to other activities that enhance local usage. 
Here, training has been used to both supply the skilled labour neces-
sary for the infrastructural project and foster an environment condu-
cive to local usage. 
The experience of the NGO PCH is instructive. Two issues that they 
typically encounter when seeking to build IXPs are administrative traps 
and overinvestment. In terms of administrative traps, there is for in-
stance little need for a feasibility study before building an IXP (‘you 
don't do a feasibility study for a street – you just build the street’). In 
terms of overinvestment, it is important to match the size of the IXP 
with the needs of the country, because overinvestment lowers the 
price/performance ratio considerably. 
Supply side: synchronizing infrastructural projects with trainings 
Infrastructure activities provide occasions for organize training activi-
ties in order to promote an increase in supply and demand for technical 
skills. South Korea’s KISA, the mother organization of KrCERT/CC, has 
been actively involved in CCB activities in Rwanda: after a Korean ISP 
had been contracted by the Rwandan government to build the infra-
structure of a Rwandan CSIRT in 2013/2014, KISA dispatched skilled 
KrCERT/CC staff to Rwanda to provide training there. 
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BOX 5: Interview with Bill Woodcock, Executive Director of Packet Clearing House  
Packet Clearing House (PCH) is a global NGO funded by businesses and governments 
with the purpose of addressing large-scale problems that affect the growth of the Inter-
net (scalability, economic problems, lack of trust and regulatory issues that involve a 
lack of understanding between the public sector and private companies). PCH focuses 
on areas where growth is low, with the objective of bringing those areas up to the global 
Internet average of doubling in size every 10.5 months. Such unequal growth exacer-
bates the digital divide and harms the future business prospects of Internet companies 
that rely on the continuing expansion of the Internet. PCH works in four main areas: 
1. Internet Exchange Points (IXPs): IXPs are the ‘factories that produce Internet 
bandwidth’ and constrain the supply side of Internet growth. All the connected 
populations in the world consume bandwidth, which, at a national aggregate, 
can be considered as an export/import question: is a country a net exporter or 
net importer of bandwidth? The world's largest net exporter of Internet 
bandwidth is the Netherlands, whereas the 43% of countries without IXPs are 
100% importers. In economic terms, 90% of IXPs cost between $4k and $40k, 
and almost all of them return that investment within less than a week. After the 
Edward Snowden affair, national security and privacy arguments are also 
being used to rationalize the construction of IXPs, as they avoid the necessity 
of routing Internet traffic through another country where different legal and 
regulatory systems prevail. 
2. The core of the Domain Name System (DNS): the DNS is a critical infrastructure 
that allows things to be found on the Internet. PCH operates the world’s largest 
authoritative DNS service platform, supporting operators of root and top-level 
domains as well as providing them with training and logistical support. PCH’s 
anycast platform is typically more resilient to Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) than other alternatives. In addition, PCH operates the only FIPS 140-2 
Level 4 DNSSEC signing platform other than the one that ICANN (Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) maintains for the root zone. 
3. Regulatory and policy issues: there are areas where the most fundamental 
problems are regulatory or political, and PCH engages directly with 
governments on longer-term and larger-scale economic development and 
national and regional infrastructure planning projects. The main issue around 
building IXPs is usually that those stakeholders that have an interest in the 
status quo may be very powerful locally, including in regulatory bodies. The 
roles of governments with respect to ccTLD administration and multi-
stakeholder Internet governance are also topics on which PCH is frequently 
engaged by national governments. 
4. Cybersecurity coordination: PCH operates a CERT that does not engage in 
digital forensics or in finding malware, but in helping cyber security 
practitioners to locate and connect with the right parties to resolve an issue. 
They are sometimes asked to do a first-pass of forensics to gather more 
information about a situation or issue that arises for teams with little technical 
ability. PCH is also the secretariat for INOC-DBA, the lower tier of the two-tier 
Internet emergency coordination system. 
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What building an IXP involves 
The global directory of IXPs is made available by PCH online.9 IXP formation is typically 
funded by voluntary donations by their participants, by PCH, or by donor organizations 
like the World Bank. They are not difficult to build, from a business or from an economic 
perspective. However, they often encounter problems with incumbent monopolies that 
attempt to block their formation, fearing competition from the new market entrants that 
IXPs enable. This situation is further complicated by the fact that some regulatory agen-
cies are not de facto independent from those monopolies, which are sometimes publicly 
owned. Before local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) get used to working with each 
other and collaboratively producing the bandwidth that they use, they are often aggres-
sive competitors: this can make the initial formation of IXPs difficult because ISPs lack 
the collegial relationship that characterizes more mature environments. Some countries 
also encounter infrastructural issues, when IXPs are set up but the ISPs lack the fibre to 
connect to them. Finally, technical training for ISPs is something that PCH has been 
delivering for over twenty years. 
 
Countries need to build critical scale first in order to take advantage of 
the impacts of network coverage. We believe that in many of the cases 
where the economic incentives are not present for donor countries to 
engage in infrastructural support, careful studies of the potential gains 
might provide a sufficient basis for becoming involved in such activi-
ties. Furthermore, synchronizing infrastructural activities with training 
activities is one way to foster a personal network of experts that can 
provide effective response after a serious cyber-attack, in partner or 
donor countries. 
2.4 Budgetary support: comprehensive programmes 
The past decade has seen a marked shift within Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) towards direct budgetary support as a tool for aid. 
There are two different types of direct budgetary support – ‘general’ 
budgetary support, which is completely untied and left to the discre-
tion of the partner government, and ‘sectoral’. This analysis is con-
cerned with the applicability of ‘sectoral’ aid – budgetary support that 
may be used by the partner government within a specific area only. 
Here the term ‘budgetary support’ is used as shorthand for ‘compre-
hensive support initiatives’– governments that engage in such activity 
tend to support all the previous types of engagements (methodological, 
technical, infrastructure) besides providing funds directly to partner 
governments for operational expenses.  
In terms of volume, some of the larger budgetary support items will 
include funds for large-scale infrastructure development – most im-
portantly, supporting the expansion of telecommunication facilities. 
                                                          
9 https://prefix.pch.net/applications/ixpdir/  
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These programmes are covered in 2.3 above; the focus here is on budg-
etary support initiatives that go beyond one-off projects: funding sus-
tained local engagement with partner governments. 
As our UK interview partner pointed out, it is important for donor 
countries to align their CCB efforts with their foreign policy. Using 
roughly the same segmentation as indicated in this report, the UK pro-
vides funding primarily for short-term projects, to be able to keep a 
certain level of flexibility. This makes it possible to maintain alignment 
between CCB efforts and foreign policy goals. For longer-term projects, 
however, it is necessary to work with international organizations.  
BOX 6: Interview with Tony Clemson (Head of Cyber Security Capacity Building & 
Prosperity, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK) 
The UK’s National Cyber Security Strategy received £860m in support for the period 
2011 to 2015. Of this budget, the FCO’s Cyber Security Capacity Building Programme 
(CSCBP) represents approximately £2m per year. About one third of the resources of 
this programme are allocated to tackling cybercrime and capacity building for LE and 
judicial systems, as well as for the improvement of international LE coordination. 
About half of their total capacity-building activity is reported as Official Development 
Assistance. 
The CSCBP of the Cyber Policy Department of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
follows rather closely our segmentation of cyber security capacity building activities: 
1. Methodological: The UK funds research through the University of Oxford's 
Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre. This funding represents 
approximately 25% (about £0.5m annually) of the capacity building fund. 
2. Technical: Support is provided to countries to develop their national 
strategies. That is a much broader work and a longer-term investment than 
other activities, but it is held to assist in building global cyber resilience. The 
CSCBP has, for example, funded the OAS to help develop the cyber security 
strategy of Jamaica. Finally, the Programme helps to strengthen national 
CERTs through FIRST trainings – it funds FIRST to develop and deliver 
training without getting directly involved. 
3. Infrastructure: Work concerning critical infrastructure overseas is conducted 
with partner organizations that want to build resilience, like the government 
and businesses of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
4. Budgetary: There is a multiplier effect in working with international 
organizations, since capacity is built at both the organizational and the local 
levels. The UK, for example, works with organizations like OAS or the 
Commonwealth Telecommunications Organization and the Commonwealth 
Cybercrime Initiative. 
 
Agility is a crucial aspect of projects because it allows for an alignment with national 
foreign policy. Projects therefore generally run for less than a year so that they can 
retain that flexibility. They are in constant dialogue with partners to coordinate inter-
national response with the needs and priorities. 
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Direct budgetary support – operational expenses 
As noted, donor governments can (and, most likely, increasingly will) 
engage in directly sponsoring individual government budget lines, par-
ticularly regarding LE, military and SSR-related tasks. Cyber security 
serves to encourage this trend, as many ‘national’ CERT functions are 
maintained in a public–private partnership (PPP) with a local compa-
ny. For instance, Austria maintains a ‘government’ and a ‘national’ 
CERT: and both are partially supported by the local Internet registry, 
Nic.at. An arrangement that among OECD countries is often born out of 
necessity is actually a great boon for partner nations (and their donors): 
a significant problem for partner countries is not only the ability to at-
tract (and fund) good talent to CERTs and related institutions, but also 
managing these challenges within the constraints of government 
guidelines. For instance, it is hard to envision an average sub-Saharan 
government salary being at all attractive for a local information securi-
ty professional, who could probably earn up to a multiple of ten times 
the government rate. If that person is trained up internally, he or she is 
likely to leave at the earliest opportunity. With a PPP, ‘market rates’ 
can be paid for local talent, talent that government salaries find ex-
tremely difficult to attract.  
While there are currently no known examples of entire CERTs or 
similar being funded by donor nations, they probably exist – and prob-
ably represent a future trend.  
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BOX 7: Interview with Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar (Head of Cyber Policy Coordination, Conflict 
Prevention and Security Policy Directorate, Europan External Action Service (EEAS))  
Organizationally, after 2011, the EEAS is a rather large organization, with 7,000 peo-
ple overall. It is managed by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
rity Policy and is reporting to the EU Foreign and Defence ministries. The EEAS cyber 
policy coordination combines diplomatic and defence issues, mainly concerning 
cyber-norm development, confidence-building measures, cyber dialogues and deal-
ings with international organizations like the UN, World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS), and NATO CCD COE. They also deal with counterparts within the EU 
(e.g. DGCONNECT, DGHOME) as well as EU member-states. They work through the 
Council Working Groups and the horizontal Friends of Presidency Group on Cyber 
Issues which allows them to work across EU competence areas. 
The EEAS structure for Cyber issues includes approximately 10 people within a 
larger coordination structure of 40 persons, including desk officers. 
Why Cyber Capacity Building? 
The EEAS engages in CCB mainly for four reasons: 
- to prevent threats (security reasons): cyberspace is not a castle and the EEAS 
wants to make sure that countries around the world are dealing with such 
issue, to avoid negative externalities (in Africa, for instance, only circa 10 
countries currently have cybercrime laws) 
- to promote the principles included in the Budapest Convention on addressing 
cybercrime around the world 
- to promote ODA, which is a logical outcome of the diplomatic efforts of the 
EU and one of its great strengths 
- to support the multi-stakeholder model through the side-effects of equipping 
countries with cyber expertise. 
 
The EEAS is in charge of the political steering of the EU CCB activities, as regards geo-
graphical areas and budgeting operations. The focus is global since the EU assistance 
instruments used for cyber capacity building are of a global nature. There is no formal 
limitation to any country or region, but the selection process of target countries in-
clude a wide variety of elements, such as human rights situation, institutional maturi-
ty of the country, willingness to cooperate with the EU etc. However, the EEAS is inves-
tigating new initiatives to foster donor coordination, such as the Global Forum on 
Cyber Expertise. 
Cooperation with and through international organizations 
In addition to international organizations like the World Bank that di-
rectly fund very large-scale projects (e.g., IXP projects, as mentioned in 
Box 5), we have interviewed international organizations that focus on 
political coordination of smaller efforts (see Box 8). 
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BOX 8: Global Forum on Cyber Expertise: a boost to global cyber capacity building (from 
an interview with Wouter Jurgens, Head of Task Force International Cyber Policies, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands)  
Capacity-building is gaining prominence as countries and companies become more 
dependent on the cyber world. In this context, the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise 
(GFCE) was launched on 16 April 2015 by the Netherlands and 42 partners. Through a 
flexible action-oriented forum dedicated to meeting the challenges facing various sec-
tors, the goal is to share knowledge and expertise without duplicating existing efforts, 
seize the economic opportunities that cyberspace offers, and complement the efforts of 
other member and non-member countries. 
Funding for the GFCE Secretariat now comes from the Dutch government (between 
€2m and €2.5m). In addition, the Dutch government provides funding for the Dutch 
GFCE initiatives; members are expected to contribute to their own CCB initiatives. The 
GFCE is one of the most concrete outcomes of the Global Conference on Cyberspace 
(GCCS) 2015 and the Dutch government is highly committed and optimistic to see it 
develop into an international forum that will strengthen cyber security capacity and 
expertise globally. 
The GFCE members have started working on four priorities: 
1. Making an inventory of current efforts in CCB. Through an agreement with 
Oxford University to include GFCE in its portal10 and examine efforts in areas 
and regions throughout the world, the GFCE aims to make information available 
to its members and the public, providing a convenient overview of CCB 
initiatives worldwide. 
2. Providing an umbrella framework and organization for CCB initiatives. For 
example, when a GFCE member mentions a certain issue (related to raising 
awareness, building a CSIRT, responsible disclosures, cybercrime etc.), the 
Forum aims to provide a platform able to connect with other members already 
working on the issue so they can help each other achieve a safer cyber domain. 
GFCE members have already announced the launch of 10 partnered CCB 
initiatives, building on previous work and on their own expertise. In the first 
group of initiatives, the focus is mainly on cyber security: Norway, OAS and the 
UK are now working on a Global Cyber Security Capacity Model to assess 
capacity on a national model; a cyber awareness initiative for governments, 
business communities and citizens has been set up by the Netherlands and 
Senegal; Symantec, the USA and the African Union Commission have started 
work on a report on policy frameworks around cyber security and cybercrime in 
Africa. 
3. Organizing an annual high-level discussion with all GFCE members to discuss 
trends, initiatives and exchange thoughts and best practices, as well as assess 
current activities. Those discussions will typically be arranged on the margins of 
the GCCS (the next is scheduled for Mexico in 2017). Before 2017, one will be 
arranged in 2016, but the venue is not yet decided. 
4. The GFCE will be supported by an administrative unit (located in The Hague) to 
be funded by the Netherlands for the time being. The Dutch hope that, in the 
future, other GFCE members will also take turns in supporting (financially or in 
kind) this administrative unit, since the initiative is global. 
                                                          
10 https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cyber security-capacity/explore/gfce  
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Funding for participation in Internet governance 
A key aspect of the budgetary support that donor countries can provide 
concerns help in addressing the three resource constraints for true en-
gagement in the field of Internet governance (Klimburg, 2006): 
1. ‘Greatly increasing travel requirements for those wishing to be 
involved in Internet governance.’ Physical meetings and con-
ferences are held all around the world, and the travel costs are a 
serious constraint – in practice, diplomats and businessmen 
crowd these meetings, instead of academics or volunteers. 
2. ‘Increasing knowledge demands that are being placed on par-
ticipants.’ Participants are expected to be familiar with a wide 
array of issues, from technical issues related to the IETF to 
ICANN documents to diplomatic, security and privacy issues. 
Educating specialists of one field in several other fields is cost-
ly, in both time and money. 
3. ‘Access to esoteric information (...) is becoming a valued cur-
rency.’ With ‘international cyber security’ at the centre of atten-
tion, governments and businesses can use information not ac-
cessible to civil society participants. If states can rely on confi-
dential information and businesses on corporate data, it is in-
creasingly difficult for people representing civil society to build 
a rational and data-driven opinion. 
Funding for travels, funding for education and funding for community-
based instruments producing open data are therefore key constraints. 
Several international organizations engage in such budgetary support 
targeting civil society, such as ICANN's Development and Public Re-
sponsibility Department (see Box 9), that aims to ‘create shared value 
in the global Internet ecosystem and amongst current and future com-
munity members.’11 
                                                          
11 https://www.icann.org/news/blog/public-responsibility-a-year-in-review  
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Box 9: Interview with Jeffrey Dunn, Supporting Education and Academic Out-
reach Track at the Development and Public Responsibility Department (DPRD), 
ICANN 
The Supporting Education and Academic Outreach Track manages relations 
with universities, schools, and non-profit bodies in order to organize events 
and help them understand what ICANN does. It is a young division of the DPRD 
(one of the four tracks), and currently involves one of the five persons working 
in the Department. The division supports on-the-ground activities with VPs or 
global leaders in the organization of events by providing funding, materials or 
contacts – such as an upcoming event on cyber security and diplomacy with 
the Permanent Mission of Egypt in New York prior to WSIS. 50 to 60 such 
events are supported each year, and that does not include the work done by 
regional teams. The aim is to be as little top–down as possible, leaving it to the 
community in question to decide the best practices. 
ICANN has several programmes focused on outreach, so that members of 
the public can understand better how ICANN works and are better able to en-
gage in the global field of Internet governance. 
● The Online Learning Platform is currently under renovation to allow 
the community an easier way to create, monitor, and update their own 
courses. The goal is to offer in-depth learning resources to current and 
future members of the ICANN community. Courses are provided, such 
as beginner's guides and documentation, to foster understanding of 
the DNS system. All these activities are considered as ‘CCB’ because 
people learn about and engage with Internet governance. The platform 
include 10,000 active monthly learners; the intention is to reach even 
more people by providing classes in additional languages beyond the 
six official UN languages. 
● ICANN also organize in person events through the Fellowship 
programme. For this programme, there is no age restriction; funding is 
provided to a few dozen people who lack the resources to attend 
ICANN meetings. This kind of budgetary support (limited to three 
participations per individual) is closely tied to economic and 
geographical conditions. 
● The NextGen@ICANN initiative focuses on persons aged 18 to 30. The 
organization brings in a small number of people to ICANN meetings 
and works with them in concert with their current occupations (usually 
as students). 
 
 
 
3. CCB and Official Development 
Assistance  
CCB is an effort that benefits both donor and partner countries. For the 
donor countries, the benefits involve security and political gains; for 
the partner countries, an enabled business environment that can spur 
economies to develop in a balanced and sustainable way. 
It is this last development objective that motivates our proposal that 
funding for CCB efforts be linked with the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) Programme of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). There are clear political gains to be achieved here: the OECD-
DAC allows the CCB component to be aligned with the ODA context, 
which is usually far less politically contentious than direct political 
subventions outside of ODA. Also, ODA sums can be immense – Nor-
way, a world leader in ODA in terms of share of GNP, spent over USD 
5.5 billion within the OECD-DAC context in 2013 alone, nearly half as 
much as the much larger German, and more than twice as much in 
terms of share of GNP.  
As a world leader in ODA, Norway’s engagement and initiatives in 
this area are watched closely. Norway was one of the first countries to 
actively pursue Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects, and its experi-
ences have been used to inform many other countries in their work. 
Particularly instructive has been Norway’s experience in work on De-
fence Security Sector Reform (DSSR), intelligence sector reform, and 
law-enforcement capacity building (See Caparini, Kjellstad and Niko-
laisen, 2011.). 
This section provides an overview of the OECD-DAC programme and 
the objectives it pursues. We then categorize the CCB activities that 
could be reported within an ODA framework. Compliance with these 
programmes allows funds that have been dedicated to CCB to count 
officially towards ODA commitments made. Essentially, this means that 
ODA-allocated funds may be used for CCB purposes without necessitat-
ing major budgetary changes. Funds that can officially be classified as 
overseas development assistance are colloquially referred to as being 
‘ODAble’.  
3.1 The OECD DAC programme and ODA 
The OECD-DAC provides in its Statistical Reporting Directives (known 
as CRS) the definition of the ODA system and the specifics of its report-
ing (OECD, 2013a). ODA is defined as ‘those flows to countries and 
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territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral devel-
opment institutions which are: 
i)  provided by official agencies, including State and local govern-
ments, or by their executive agencies; and 
ii) each transaction which: 
 a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development 
and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and 
 b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at 
least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%). 
The OECD-DAC has existed since 1961, and has the mandate to ‘pro-
mote development co-operation and other policies so as to contribute 
to sustainable development, including pro-poor economic growth, 
poverty reduction, improvement of living standards in developing 
countries, and a future in which no country will depend on aid.’ It func-
tions as an international forum with donor countries and recipient bod-
ies.  
These bodies may be either countries that are in the list of DAC 
members (OECD, 2013b) (when transactions are undertaken by a donor 
country directly with a developing country, the transaction is termed 
bilateral) or multilateral development institutions (OECD, 2013c) (in 
which case transactions are termed multilateral if they satisfy a set of 
criteria to ensure their multilateral character, or multi-bi or earmarked 
if they do not satisfy these criteria). In the case of a multilateral devel-
opment institution, only the share of the contribution that corresponds 
to its development activities is reportable as ODA. 
3.2 Which CCB activities qualify as ODA? 
We now turn to the activities within our segmentation that appear most 
closely aligned with the goals of the specific list of activities that can be 
reported as ODA (‘ODAble’). This is not meant as an exhaustive list, but 
as a list of activities that countries do today that they could start report-
ing as ODA. The CRS codes provided below are updated as of May 2015 
(OECD, 2013c); see OECD (2013a) for explanation of the activities in-
cluded. 
Non security-related ODA activities 
● CRS CODE 22040 Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT): Computer hardware and software; Internet access; IT 
training. When sector cannot be specified. In fact, ODA includes 
all ‘development-oriented social and cultural programmes (...) 
to enhance the social and cultural development of nationals of 
developing countries.’ By enhancing the level of knowledge and 
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use of ICT and Internet-enabled technologies, those pro-
grammes foster a thriving business environment that will con-
tribute heavily to the development of the economy. Methodo-
logical programmes designed for the civil society at large, nota-
bly to disseminate knowledge about the rule of law in cyber-
space, might qualify as well for this kind of ODA. 
→ Funding for technical support programmes designed to 
enhance Internet access and build cyber capacities, including 
the provision of hardware and software for civil society at large, 
such as all the funding for IXPs and trainings for the ISPs (see 
Box 5) is ODAble. 
● CRS CODE 99820 Promotion of development awareness: 
Spending in donor country for heightened awareness/interest 
in development cooperation (brochures, lectures, special re-
search projects, etc.). In fact, ODA includes research, defined as 
‘financing by the official sector, whether in the donor country or 
elsewhere, of research into the problems of developing coun-
tries. This may be either (i) undertaken by an agency or institu-
tion whose main purpose is to promote the economic growth or 
welfare of developing countries or (ii) commissioned or ap-
proved, and financed or part-financed, by an official body from 
a general purpose institution with the specific aim of promoting 
the economic growth or welfare of developing countries’ (OECD, 
2103a). 
→ Funding for research projects in the field of capacity 
building, such as funding for Oxford's Global Cyber Security 
Centre from the UK FCO (see Box 6), is ODAble. 
Security-related ODA activities 
Various security expenditures included in the definition of ODA are 
particularly relevant for CCB activities. Therefore, the securi-
ty/development nexus includes not only SSR activities but also all ac-
tivities that can have an impact on SSR. 
● CRS CODE 15210 Security System Management and reform: 
Technical cooperation provided to parliament, government 
ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist 
review and reform of the security system to improve democratic 
governance and civilian control; technical co-operation provid-
ed to government to improve civilian oversight and democratic 
control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing 
of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a 
public expenditure management programme; assistance to civil 
society to enhance its competence and capacity to scrutinize the 
security system so that it is managed in accordance with demo-
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cratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and 
good governance.  
→ All activities at the intersection of CCB and SSR are 
ODAble and should be reported with this code. This in-
cludes activities aimed at improving civilian oversight and 
democratic control of security expenditure (methodological 
support) and assistance to civil society to enhance its compe-
tence and capacity 
● CRS CODE 15130 Legal and judicial development: Support to 
institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector, both 
formal and informal (...) maintenance of law and order and 
public safety; border management; law enforcement agencies, 
police, prisons and their supervision. (…) Measures that support 
the improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and 
regulations; legislative and constitutional drafting and review; 
legal reform; integration of formal and informal systems of law. 
In fact, ODA includes ‘expenditures on police training in rou-
tine civil policing functions, but not training in counter-
subversion methods, suppression of political dissidence, or in-
telligence-gathering on political activities’ (OECD, 2013a). 
→ Technical support for LE-related teams, community-
based instruments and methodological programmes around law 
enforcement issues is ODAble. This code should be used for 
activities that do not primarily target security system reform 
and are not undertaken in connection with post-conflict and 
peacebuilding activities. 
The above list is by no means exhaustive. Other categories of the code 
152xx (security-relevant codes) could be examined for their relevance 
for CCB. Of course, governments are always free to ignore these estab-
lished programmes – there are many in the ODA community who 
would undoubtedly be unhappy about any efforts to re-position money 
away from established ODA activity to new ventures, let alone security-
related ones. However, as the Netherlands has shown – as mentioned, 
funding for the GFCE initiative comes almost entirely from the ODA 
budget – there is much to be gained from working with existing struc-
tures. And the sums under consideration represent fractions of total 
ODA budgets.  
3.3 Is ‘ODAble’ really ‘doable’? 
Is it in fact desirable to connect CCB with ODA? We have indicated sev-
eral positive reasons why CCB is innately close to the established de-
velopment agenda. In fact, most governments aspiring to implement 
CCB have (or will) connect them with the overall ODA framework. How-
ever, significant concerns should be kept in mind.  
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The idea of connecting the term ‘cyber security’ with the term ‘de-
velopment’ (and especially with ‘Internet governance’) is contentious. 
From a development perspective, concerns on further ‘securitizing’ aid 
are sure to be raised. From an operational international security per-
spective, moving from established ‘military–military’ (or law enforce-
ment, or similar) cooperative environments into the highly regulated 
and transparent ODA field entails certain challenges – among them, 
the prospect of not being able to compete with non-OECD countries that 
are not bound by the same stringent rules. Finally, many in Western 
Internet governance have been resisting any increased ‘governmentali-
zation’, let alone ‘securitization’, of their field – and focusing CCB on 
Internet governance would confirm both these fears. 
These concerns are not unfounded – in the worst case, government 
risks significantly impairing its ability to deliver highly needed assis-
tance, while at the same time weakening both the ODA and Internet 
governance community. The first overriding benefit of a CCB pro-
gramme linked to ODA can be easily summarized: the connection great-
ly facilitates access to funds. As yet, however, the sums for most CCB 
programmes are tiny – not even a fraction of most ODA budgets, mak-
ing it doubtful that the tradeoffs are worth it at current budgetary lev-
els. However, there is substantial scope for increasing average CCB 
budgets ten-fold, even twenty-fold, and that would indeed speak in 
favor of connecting it to the ODA field in general. If, however, such a 
budgetary commitment is not intended, or is even excluded in the 
longer run, then the entire ‘development’ focus of CCB will need to be 
revaluated. 
There is a second and by no means minor benefit in connecting the 
OECD-DAC regime with CCB. And that, bizarre as it might seem from a 
traditional ODA point of view, is de-securitizing (or more importantly, 
‘de-militarizing’) international cybersecurity, and putting a ‘non-
politicized, defence-oriented’ view front and centre in the debate. Pure-
ly bilateral, non-aid related CCB efforts will doubtless be accompanied 
with accusations of favouritism and be perceived as part of the ‘great 
power’ struggle – for instance with donors insisting that only their IT 
products be used, or political equipment not be installed, or political 
positions be taken on the international stage. A cornerstone of the de-
velopment community’s approach has always been to – as far as possi-
ble – de-politicize the aid process, and make it needs-based above all. 
Arguably, this is what the international cyber security discourse ur-
gently needs – acknowledgement that all actors would benefit from an 
overall increase in the basic level of cybersecurity and increased partic-
ipation in Internet governance. Such a process seems able to underline 
the view of the Internet as a common resource (a ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ in international law), a view that claims that everyone should 
benefit from the Internet while emphasizing that everyone also needs 
to protect it. 
4. Conclusions 
Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) is a newcomer in the nexus of 
security and development. However, despite the undoubted complexity 
of the subject, it can be aligned within existing budgetary structures – 
in particular those currently used in connection with Security Sector 
Reform within the OECD-DAC context.  
However, CCB is much more than a new addition to the traditional 
ODA family. There are three principle reasons why CCB is likely to grow 
in importance. First, it is becoming increasingly clear that a key factor 
for economic and social development (and therefore political stability) 
is access to cyberspace. This invariably means that cyber security be-
comes a central element in encouraging this access, and in ensuring 
that Internet growth is not jeopardised through criminal behaviour. 
Secondly, given the nature of the Internet, if countries in the rich in-
dustrialized world are to be able to respond to cyber-threats against 
their own nations, greater collaboration is needed with the developing 
world – which increasingly hosts the infrastructure and the actors be-
hind malicious cyber-activity. Such collaboration is possible only if 
basic cyber security institutions and skills are available in the partner 
countries – and that is very much in the donor countries’ direct inter-
est. Thirdly, the increasingly politicized ‘global struggle’ for dominance 
over governance of the Internet is becoming a critical issue within in-
ternational relations. With two opposing views as to how the Internet 
should be governed, the importance of the ‘swing states’ – nearly all 
within the developing world – rises. In view of this triple rationale (re-
gional stability, national security, international diplomacy), CCB could 
easily become one of the most important activities in security and de-
velopment in the future – especially given its relatively modest size 
today.12 
The following recommendations, intended for Norway specifically, 
are also however applicable in general as well.  
1. Establish a CCB programme modelled on the UK approach 
The UK approach is encapsulated in four dimensions that also form 
the basis of this study – methodological, technical, infrastructural, 
and budgetary. This segmentation is considered flexible and scala-
ble for future purposes, and this study has taken these four dimen-
sions as the ‘common denominator’ of all tasks needed to help a 
partner government develop the ability to respond to cyber-threats. 
                                                          
12  In 2015, the Dutch and UK governments, for instance, have calculated only some 
USD 2.5 million per year for CCB – sums that are, however, expected to rise sharp-
ly.  
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Each dimension has a slightly different constituency and delivery 
partner – the budgetary support dimension addresses governmen-
tal infrastructure and operational expenses, the infrastructure di-
mension addresses means to support private sector and telecom-
munications development, the technical dimension the individual 
skills and partnerships within cyber security, and the methodologi-
cal dimension can deliver the rationale, methods, and evaluation of 
these programmes as well as providing guidance to partner nations 
on how to formulate overall national cyber security strategies. Here 
it should be recalled that the ‘methodological’ line item in the UK 
programme represents basic social science research, and is not re-
stricted to the drafting of CCB methodologies per se.  
2. Utilize private-sector expertise to help deliver technical projects 
A major challenge for many states (and especially Norway) in deliv-
ering DSSR-related projects has been the impossibility of outsourc-
ing to non-governmental actors. Many governments were forced to 
support such projects by drawing on a (often relatively small) cadre 
of government civil servants.13 In CCB, the converse would apply – 
most of the trained individuals would, by default, come from the 
private sector, and could easily be augmented by international pri-
vate sector actors as well. While it is recommended that certain 
guidelines and recommendations (e.g., the kinds of certification 
methods to be taught) should be drafted by the appropriate gov-
ernment ministry or agency (in Norway, the NSM), implementation 
may be left almost completely to non-governmental actors.   
3. Support infrastructure development initiatives 
Governments should examine their options in urging international 
financial institutions (IFIs) to expand on their existing projects 
supporting ITC infrastructure development. In particular, Norway 
should consider what other needs may exist that currently are not 
being met through IFIs – either due to the very small budgetary re-
quirements or through lack of expertise. Larger initiatives should be 
given special consideration.  
4. Connect with non-CCB programmes dedicated to improving the 
business environment 
The true benefits of the Internet for local businesses in the develop-
ing world are unlikely to be realized unless the core conditions for 
economic growth can be met. Investing in the rule of law, and in 
education, is also vital to the success of CCB programmes. Similar-
ly, programmes to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises 
and other specific business finance projects, can closely align with 
the needs of CCB. All these related programmes should be consid-
                                                          
13  For instance, DSSR projects put a relative manpower strain on the Norwegian Min-
istry of Defence (Caparini, Kjellstad and Nikolaisen, 2011) 
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ered and mapped before embarking on a comprehensive CCB pro-
gramme. 
5. Support cyber security community resources  
Most tools used globally by cyber security professionals have been 
developed by the security community itself. These tools are often 
provided free of service by CERTs, or maintained by non-
governmental organizations centrally. By supporting these re-
sources (which can be developed and provided anywhere) a CCB 
programme can make an important contribution – not only to the 
partner country, but to the global infosec (cybersecurity) communi-
ty as a whole.  
6. Support both governments and civil society engagement in Internet 
Governance 
Various resource constraints inhibit global participation in the mul-
ti-stakeholder approach. This applies equally to civil society as well 
as to governments – travel needs alone may represent an unsur-
mountable obstacle for participation in Internet governance. Donor 
countries have a range of options on how to engage here, such as 
providing budgetary support to government departments (in case of 
government support) or empowering local NGOs. 
7. Examine the possibility of ‘sponsoring’ a partner cyber security 
entity 
The economics of the cyber security industry make it unlikely that 
developing countries can afford many good technical professionals 
– or retain them for long, if they train them internally. A compro-
mise solution can be an outside organization that is run like a PPP 
– perhaps with the help of a local Internet registry or telecommuni-
cations company – and which can further be funded through a CCB 
programme. The costs of such an engagement can be sizeable and 
are currently outside of any known Western CCB programme, but 
the potential returns on investment are significant. It would be best 
to attempt such multi-year engagements only in regions where deep 
partnerships already exist, especially involving the security ser-
vices or similar institutions. 
8. Leverage international ODA efforts to promote CCB 
Norway has long been a trendsetter in international aid and devel-
opment, and exercises great influence on how other nations allo-
cate funds. Building on its experience with other ODA-specific in-
novations (such as SSR), Norway could contribute to raising the 
overall awareness of CCB projects within the wider ODA communi-
ty. True, there are good reasons to be wary of connecting CCB with 
the ODA approach. If the size of the overall programme is not in-
tended to exceed a very low threshold (a few percentage points of 
overall ODA flows), that significantly weakens the argument for 
linking CCB to ODA.  
Cyber Security Capacity Building: Developing Access  49 
Cyber Security Capacity Building is a new field, and its budgets and 
concepts are as yet relatively undeveloped. However, this is bound to 
change – the cross-cutting importance of the Internet for economic and 
social growth, the relevance for donor-side national security, and the 
growing international relations and diplomacy perspective together 
provide powerful reasons for considering CCB. The question is not if 
donor countries will increasingly embark on such programmes, but 
when – and who will be the leaders defining this topic for the future. 
The question remains: which actors will be first in building these new 
partnerships – and which will be last?  
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